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Abstract Reaching agreement in the presence of Byzantine arbitrary
faults is a fundamental problem in distributed systems It has been shown
that message authentication is a useful tool in designing protocols with
high fault tolerance but it imposes the additional problem of key distri

bution
In the past agreement protocols using message authentication required
complete agreement on all public keys Because this pre
agreement has to
rely on techniques outside the system eg trusted servers which never
fail it is useful to consider lower levels of key distribution which need
as few assumptions as possible
In this paper we identify several levels of key distribution and describe
their properties with regard to the achievable fault tolerance in two agree

ment problems
Keywords Byzantine agreement crusader agreement authentication distrib
uted systems fault tolerance
  Introduction
The problem of distributed agreement arises when a set of nodes in a distributed
system need to have a consistent view of a message sent by one of them despite
the presence of arbitrarily faulty nodes Several kinds of agreement have been
dened in the past The most stringent kind of agreement is Byzantine agreement
BA as dened in LSP	
 It requires that the following three conditions be
met
B All correct nodes agree on the same value
B
 If the sender is correct all correct nodes agree on the value of the sender
B Each correct node eventually decides on a value
One variant of this agreement is crusader agreement CA introduced in Dol	

Here it is not necessary that all nodes agree on the same value if the sender is
faulty It is required though that those nodes which do not agree know that the
sender is faulty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C All correct nodes that do not explicitly know that the sender is faulty agree
on the same value
C
 If the sender is correct all correct nodes agree on the value of the sender
C Each correct node eventually decides on a value or knows that the sender
is faulty
Protocols for distributed agreement are generally divided into two classes au
thenticated protocols and nonauthenticated protocols In authenticated proto
cols all messages are signed digitally in a way that the signatures cannot be
forged and a signed message can be unambiguously assigned to its signer This
mechanism allows a node to prove to others that it has received a certain message
from a certain node Authenticated protocols can tolerate an arbitrary number
of faulty nodes In nonauthenticated protocols no messages are signed For BA
and CA these protocols require more than two thirds of the participating nodes
to be correct LSP	
 Dol	

While authenticated protocols oer the best fault tolerance it is not at all
trivial to distribute the public keys of all participants of an agreement protocol
consistently amongst each other Typically key distribution requires a single
trusted entity or a group of entities which is completely reliable as a whole
Gon Since these assumptions restrict the usual assumptions about the
participants behaviour they should be kept as weak as possible Hence it is
useful to have a look at possible scenarios with dierent kinds of key distribution
and dierent common knowledge about these distributions
 Model of Computation
In this section we describe the model of computation used throughout this paper
Our world consists of a fully interconnected network with n nodes processors
t of which may be faulty In order to avoid special cases we assume that n   
and n  t For n   there are trivial solutions and for n  t agreement
always holds by denition
The nodes operate at a known minimal speed and messages are transmitted
reliably in bounded time Furthermore a receiver of a message can identify
its immediate sender Communication takes place in successive rounds In each
round a node may send messages to other nodes and receives all messages sent
to it in the current round The actions a node takes in the next round depend
solely on the messages it has received so far We make no assumptions about
the type of failures that occur If a node is faulty it may behave in an arbitrary
manner This type of behaviour is usually referred to as Byzantine fault
In addition we assume the existence of an unforgeable signature scheme
Examples for signature schemes which are unforgeable with a suciently high
probability given todays state of the art are DSA and RSA Nat
 RSA	
In these schemes a prospective signer has a pair of keys namely a private key
and a public key The private key is used for signing while the public key can
be used to verify a signature made with the private key
The assumption of a signature scheme alone is not very strong see sec
tion 
 It is often necessary to make assumptions about the distribution of
the public keys The strongest assumption is that of complete authentication It
comprises the following four properties
A If a correct node assigns a signed message to a correct node P  then P has
signed the message
A
 A message signed by a correct node P is assigned to P by all correct nodes
A If a message is assigned to a possibly faulty node P by a correct node
then all correct nodes assign it to P 
A All correct nodes can sign messages
In terms of privatepublic keys properties A and A
 state that there is
agreement on the public keys of the correct nodes and the correct nodes keep
their secret keys secret Property A extends the agreement to the public keys
of the faulty nodes Owing to the Byzantine failures it cannot be assumed that
the faulty nodes keep their secret keys secret Fault models which assume that
faulty nodes do not give their secrets away or sign messages on behalf of others
are used in GLR EM
 Levels of Authentication
Solutions for agreement problems usually assume either no authentication or
complete authentication These assumptions are only two extreme points in a
spectrum of possible scenarios In this section we will identify several dierent
levels of authentication give situations in which they arise and present their
properties with regard to the achievable fault tolerance
 No Authentication
In this situation no means of key distribution and no signature scheme is avail
able or wanted eg due to lack of processor speed lack of private local storage
or insucient trust into existing methods Here applies the longknown require
ment n  t PSL	 LSP	
 which makes agreement between three nodes
impossible if one may fail
 Local Byzantine	
 Authentication
This type of agreement can be reached when no means of agreement on the keys
is provided and each node distributes its public key by itself using a signature
scheme With a challengeresponse key distribution protocol properties A and
A
 can be enforced if A holds and a signature scheme exists Bor That
is a faulty node can distribute dierent public keys to dierent nodes but it can
not claim a public key of a correct node for itself This makes local authentication
strictly stronger than no authentication A faulty node can not forge messages
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Fig  Proof of Theorem 
sent by correct nodes without invalidating the signature Furthermore a message
signed by a correct node cannot be misattributed to a faulty node
Although no complete agreement on the public keys of the faulty nodes can be
guaranteed this level of authentication has been shown to be useful for Failure
Discovery a subproblem of Byzantine agreement HH Bor Using local
authentication Byzantine agreement with few messages in the failurefree runs
is possible
Unfortunately in this setting the impossibility of Byzantine agreement for
n  t cannot be overcome as stated in the following theorem
Theorem It is not possible to reach Byzantine agreement if one third of the
nodes is faulty and only local authentication is assumed
Proof This proof is a variation of the proof in LSP	
 Let n  t Then it is
possible to partition the nodes into three nonempty sets A B and C such that
each set contains at most t elements The members of these sets will be denoted
a
i
 b
i
 and c
i
 respectively The sender will always be a
 

We consider the most general protocol with an arbitrary number of rounds
If a correct node receives a message in round r it signs this message and sends
it to all nodes in round r   Thus the maximum possible information ow
is achieved We do not specify how the information is used to reach the nal
decision We will only observe whether or not a node receives dierent messages
in dierent runs of a protocol If the messages are the same the node has to
draw the same conclusions in the respective runs
We will consider three possible scenarios 
 
 

 and 

 In 
 
 the nodes in
B are faulty and a
 
sends  In 

 the nodes in C are faulty and a
 
sends 
In 

 the nodes in A are faulty and a
 
sends send  to C and  to B
Hence in 
 
 the nodes in C have to decide for  and in 

 the nodes in B
have to decide for  We will show that in 

 the nodes in B receive the same
messages as in 

 while the nodes in C receive the same messages as in 
 
 So
in 

 the nodes in B and C have to decide for dierent values which contradicts
B An example with tree nodes will be given below
We will use the following notation for the messages 
a
 
BCB
means that the
value  was rst signed by a
 
 then by a node in B followed by a node in C
and then again by a node in B Small letters denote actual signatures while
capitals represent the signature of some member of the respective set For nodes
in A there will be two sets of signatures They will be denoted A
B
a
iB
 and A
C
a
iC
 respectively
The three scenarios will be constructed in a way that the signatures on all
messages seen by correct nodes in B and C are of the following form
 The rst signature is a
 B
if the value is  and a
 C
if the value is 
 A
B
is followed by B or A
B

 A
C
is followed by C or A
C

 B and C are followed by A
B
 A
C
 B or C
Signatures A
B
and A
C
cannot be recognized by correct nodes in C and B
respectively The behaviour of the nodes in the three scenarios is as follows
Scenario 
 
B faulty
 All nodes distribute consistent keys in the key distri
bution protocol The nodes in A sign all messages with A
C
 In the rst
round of the agreement protocol a
 
signs the value  and sends it to all
nodes In the following rounds the nodes in A and C sign all messages
correctly and send them to all nodes
The nodes in B treat all messages from B and C correctly When a node
b
i
receives a message from A it replaces those signatures A
C
 which are
consecutively at the end with A
B
 The signatures A
B
are chosen arbitrar
ily by the nodes in B and cannot be recognized by nodes in A or C If
all signatures on the message are from nodes in A the value is set to 
before substituting the signatures Finally b
i
signs the message correctly
and sends it to all nodes If for example b
i
receives 
a
 C
c

a
C
a
C
 it will
echo the message as 
a
 C
c

a
B
a
B
b
i
 while a message 
a
 C
becomes 
a
 B
b
i

Scenario 

C faulty
 All nodes distribute consistent keys in the key distri
bution protocol The nodes in A sign all messages with A
B
 In the rst
round of the agreement protocol a
 
signs the value  and sends it to all
nodes In the following rounds the nodes in A and B sign all messages
correctly and send them to all nodes
The nodes in C treat all messages from B and C correctly When a node
c
i
receives a message from A it replaces those signatures A
B
 which are
consecutively at the end with A
C
 The signaturesA
C
are chosen arbitrarily
by the nodes in C and cannot be recognized by nodes in A or B If all
signatures on the message are from nodes in A the value is set to  before
substituting the signatures Finally c
i
signs the message correctly and
sends it to all nodes If for example c
i
receives 
a
 B
b

a
B
a
B
 it will echo
the message as 
a
 B
b

a
C
a
C
c
i
 while a message 
a
 B
becomes 
a
 C
c
i

Scenario 

A faulty
 In the key distribution protocol the nodes in B and
C distribute consistent keys The nodes in A send dierent keys A
B
and
A
C
to the nodes in B and C
In the rst round of the agreement protocol a
 
sends 
a
 B
to B and 
a
 C
to C In the following rounds the nodes in B and C sign all messages
correctly and send them to all nodes The nodes in A also sign all messages
and send them to all nodes Before sending a message to B though they
replace those signatures A
C
which are consecutively at the end with A
B

If there are only signatures by nodes in A the value is set to  Likewise in
bb
cc
aa
B
aa
B
 a
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bb
cc
 
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Fig  Impossibility of Byzantine agreement with local authentication
messages to C signatures A
B
are replaced by A
C
 and the value is set to
 This is possible since the nodes in A may cooperate If for example a
i
receives 
a
 B
b

a
B
a
B
 it will forward this message to C as 
a
 B
b

a
C
a
C
a
iC

It can easily be seen that for each message received by a node in B in scenario 


there is an indistinguishable message in scenario 

 and vice versa The same
holds for the nodes of C in scenarios 
 
and 

 Since a node b
i
has to decide for
 in 

 and a node c
i
has to decide for  in 
 
 they decide for dierent values
in 

 This violates B This reasoning is depicted in Fig   
Example  The idea of the proof will be demonstrated at the most simple ex
ample There are three nodes a b and c One of them may be faulty and the
sender is a Scenarios 
 
and 

are depicted in Fig 
 Messages to and from a
in the second round are omitted as well as selfaddressed messages The boxes
at each node show the respective views of the public keys and faulty nodes are
shadowed
If c is correct it will receive 
a
C
in the rst round of 
 
and 

 In the second
round it will receive 
a
C
a
C
 
a
C
c
 and 
a
B
b
 where a
B
is not recognizable to c
From these messages c can deduce that one of the following cases must hold
 a is correct and has sent  The unrecognizable signature has been produced
by b In this case c has to decide for 

 b is correct but a has sent dierent values to b and c Furthermore a has
sent dierent public keys to b and c Then c has to decide for the same
value as b
In order to fulll B
 c has to decide for  If a is faulty b sees messages
Protocol for Crusader Agreement
 The sender signs its value and sends it to all others
 If a node recognizes the signature it transmits the received value and
signature to all others Otherwise it decides for a faulty sender
 If a node has not decided in the second step it looks at the values signed
by the sender it has seen so far If there is exactly one distinct value it
decides for that value Otherwise it decides for a faulty sender
Fig  Crusader agreement for crusader authentication
consistent with 

and decides for  which violates B If b and c always
decide for some default value one of them violates B in 
 
or 


The proof for the achievable fault tolerance for crusader agreement is sim
ilar to the proof given above Hence to reach crusader agreement under local
authentication more than two thirds of correct nodes are necessary
 Sound but Incomplete Authentication
For this kind of authentication we assume that no two correct nodes have dier
ent public keys of a third node However a node may not know the public keys
of all other nodes In this setting two cases can be distinguished In the rst
case there is no agreement on who knows which keys while in the second case
this agreement is assumed
Crusader Authentication Here we assume that only the public keys of the
faulty nodes are distributed incompletely but it is not known who actually knows
whose public key
This requires a more benign behaviour of the faulty nodes during the key
distribution process A faulty node may still choose not to send its public key
to some other nodes but it does not distribute dierent keys Apart from that
it may behave arbitrarily Instead of A A
 
holds in this context
A
 
All correct nodes which assign a certain message to a node assign it to
the same node
We will refer to this level of authentication as crusader authentication since
the public keys of the nodes are agreed upon like values sent by crusader agree
ment If a correct node A has a key of B it is the correct one Otherwise A
knows that B is faulty
In such a setting crusader agreement is possible for any number of faulty
nodes It can be reached in only two rounds see Fig 
Theorem The protocol in Fig  reaches crusader agreement for any n   t

if crusader authentication holds
Proof C is trivially fullled for those nodes which decide that the sender is
faulty Now assume that two correct nodes decide for dierent values Then both
must have received their values with the senders signature in the rst round
Furthermore they must not have received a dierent signed value in the second
round But that is impossible since both must have sent their values to all others
in the second round
C
 is fullled because a correct sender signs its value in the rst round and
sends it to all nodes Since the sender is correct all nodes assign the message
correctly and send it to all others in the second round There exists exactly one
value signed by the sender so all correct nodes will decide for that value C
is fullled by the limited number of rounds  
Byzantine agreement can be reached with n   
t The protocol in Fig 
has this fault tolerance It is a variation of the Exponential Information Gath
ering EIG protocol which was introduced by BarNoy et al BDDS	 based
on the protocol in LSP	
 In this protocol the sender starts by sending its
value to all other nodes In the following t rounds each node signs and forwards
messages received in the previous round to the other nodes
During protocol execution each node maintains an EIG tree which contains
the received information in a structured manner Such a tree has t levels one
level per communication round The root has n  children and in each of the
following levels the vertices have one child less than those of the previous level
Hence on level r each vertex has n  r children we consider the root level as
level  A part of such a tree for n   is shown in Fig 
The vertices have labels which are assigned in the following manner The
root is labeled with the senders name In the following levels the children of
a vertex are labeled with the names of the nodes not yet on the path from the
root We identify a vertex in the tree by the the sequence of labels from the root
to the respective vertex Note that in no such sequence a nodes name appears
twice A vertex labeled with the name of a correct faulty node will be called a
correct faulty vertex From the construction a vertex on level r has at most t
faulty children and at least n r  t correct children
In the rst round of the protocol each node stores the value received from
the sender in the root of its EIG tree In the following rounds each correct node
broadcasts the contents of the level of its tree most recently lled in and lls
the next level with messages it receives If a node X receives a message from Y
claiming that it has stored v in vertex ABCDE X stores v in vertex ABCDEY
of its EIG tree Hence a value v in vertex ABCDEY is interpreted as Y said
E said    B said A said v If a node failed to send a value a default value is
stored
Due to the structure of the tree not all received messages are stored Those
messages in which a node reports about a message which was once sent by itself
are ignored In Fig  labels and stored values are separated by a colon The
faulty vertices are shadowed
When a node has completed its tree after round t it uses the collected
data to decide for the outcome of the protocol This is done by resolving each
Protocol for Byzantine Agreement
 The nodes ll their EIG trees for t rounds They only consider mes

sages which carry the recognizable signature of the immediate sender
 A leaf is resolved to its value with the last signature removed
 For a non
leaf on level r  t with label X two cases are distinguished
 The signature of X is known Consider the set of resolved children
which are signed correctly If it has at least t r members take
the relative majority value The vertex is then resolved to that
value without the last signature If the set has fewer members the
vertex is resolved to a default value
 Signature of the X is unknown Take a set of maximum size of
resolved children which carry the same signature If it contains at
least t  r   elements take the relative majority The vertex is
then resolved to that value with the last signature removed If no
such set exists the vertex is resolved to a default value
 The result of the protocol is the resolved value of the root
Fig  Byzantine agreement for crusader authentication
vertex to a certain value depending on the resolved values of its children The
exact rules are given in steps 
 and  of the protocol A vertex which is resolved
to the same value by all correct nodes will be called common The following
example will demonstrate the rules for resolving
Example  Let n   and t   see Fig  Let us further assume that the ve
children of a vertex at level r  
 are resolved to the following values default
default 
ab
 

ab
 
 

ab
 
 A reducing node who knows the signature of b notices that
only one of these values has been signed correctly Since   t r  
 it will
choose the default value
A node which does not know the signature of b uses values 

ab
 
and 

ab
 
for its
decision since they constitute the largest set of values with the same signature
and the set has two elements
 
 The majority value is 

ab
 
 and the vertex will be
resolved to 

a
 Since two correct nodes can reduce this vertex to dierent values
it is not common
The following two lemmas will be used to prove the correctness of the pro
tocol
Lemma Assuming crusader authentication and n   
t   the following
holds	 A correct vertex is resolved to its stored value with the last signature
removed
 
We assume implicitly that it is possible to decide whether two signatures were made
with the same private key This can be achieved when each signature is required to
come with the respective public key
D
resolved values
A 
a
E 
ae
F 
af
G 
ag
E 
ab
F
ab
 
G
ab
 
D 
ad
C
B 
ab
C
Fig  Part of an EIG tree
Proof The proof is by induction on the levels of the tree from the leaves to the
root For a leaf the lemma is trivially correct Now suppose that for all vertices
above level r the lemma is true Then it is also true for a correct vertex on level
r because it has at least t r   correct children due to n   
t 
From the induction hypothesis all of them will be resolved to their stored
values Since the vertex on level r is correct its stored value is the same as the
resolved values of the children Furthermore the signatures on the values are
correct Hence the vertex will be resolved as stated in the lemma  
Lemma Assuming crusader authentication and n   
t   the following
holds	 A faulty vertex which has only faulty ascendants

is common
Proof The proof is again by induction on the levels from the leaves to the root
On the last level t the lemma is true because there is no such vertex Now
suppose that for all vertices above level r the lemma is true We will now show
that the lemma is true for the vertices on level r
Consider a faulty vertex on level r which has only faulty ascendants With
the induction hypothesis and Lemma  all children of this vertex are common
Then all correct nodes resolve that vertex to the same value because they will
base their decision on the same set of values This can be shown as follows A
set of t r elements can not contain only values from faulty vertices since a
faulty vertex with faulty ascendants in level r has at most t r faulty children
But if there is one value from a correct vertex in the set then all values carry
the correct signature since a correct node will only forward values with correct
signatures  
Theorem Assuming crusader authentication and n   
t   the following
holds	 The algorithm in Fig 
 reaches Byzantine agreement
Proof If the sender is correct the root of the tree will be resolved to the value
received in the rst round by all correct nodes due to Lemma  Hence all
correct nodes agree on the correct value

An ascendant is a vertex on the direct path to the root
If the sender is faulty the root is common due to Lemma  Hence all correct
nodes agree on the same value  
The next theorem shows that the fault tolerance of n   
t   cannot be
improved
Theorem Byzantine agreement cannot be reached for n  
t if only crusader
authentication holds
Proof Suppose that n  
t holds Then the nodes can be partitioned in four
nonempty sets A B C andD such that no set contains more than t
 members
Now consider four scenarios where in each scenario the members of two sets
behave faulty The sender is always a
 

In all four scenarios the nodes in C will play the role of those who do not
know the public keys of nodes in A If A is correct they will only pretend not
to know the keys If A if faulty they will actually not know the keys
Scenario 
 
C and D faulty
 All public keys are known to all nodes In
the rst round a
 
sends 
a
 
to all and the nodes in A and B forward all
messages correctly
The nodes in C behave correctly except that they pretend not to know the
public keys of the nodes in A The nodes in D behave towards the nodes
in C as follows They pretend to receive from nodes in A messages of the
form m
A
 
A
 
 where A
 
is recognizable to D Furthermore they forward
messages 
AA
to C as 
A
 
A
 
D
 Apart from this they behave correctly
Scenario 

B and C faulty
 All public keys are known to all nodes In
the rst round a
 
sends 
a
 
to all and the nodes in A and D forward all
messages correctly
The nodes in C behave correctly except that they pretend not to know the
public keys of the nodes in A The nodes in B behave towards the nodes
in C as follows They pretend to receive from nodes in A messages of the
form m
A
 
A
 
 where A
 
is recognizable to B Furthermore they forward
messages 
AA
to C as 
A
 
A
 
B
 Apart from this they behave correctly
Scenario 

A and B faulty
 All public keys except those from nodes in A
are known to all nodes The keys of A are known to all except the nodes
in C
During the agreement protocol the nodes behave exactly as in 


Scenario 

A and D faulty
 All public keys except those from nodes in A
are known to all nodes The keys of A are known to all except the nodes
in C
During the agreement protocol the nodes behave exactly as in 
 

The nodes in the respective sets have the following views see Fig 
 The nodes in B cannot distinguish 
 
from 

 Hence they decide in both
scenarios for 
 The nodes in C cannot distinguish 

and 

 Since the nodes in B decide
for  in 

 the nodes in C have to decide for  in 

and 


  
B
  

C
  

D
  

A   A  
   
B   B   D    D  
  
C    C  
Fig 	 Proof of Theorem 
 The nodes in D cannot distinguish 

and 

 Hence they decide in both
scenarios for 
With this reasoning the nodes in C and D decide for dierent values in 


which contradicts B  
Partial Authentication In this setting it is common knowledge whose public
keys are distributed completely For simplicity we will only regard the case in
which a nodes public key is either known to all nodes or to none This situation
arises when the keys are distributed by a globally trusted server which does not
know all keys or when some of the nodes are not able to sign messages There is
no relationship between the state of a node faultycorrect and the distribution
of its public key Here A holds but A becomes
A
  
Only a known set of s nodes can sign messages
We will call this level of authentication partial authentication A node whose
public key is known is called signer We can distinguish whether or not the
sender is a signer
Sender is no signer If n  s   
t  the sender sends its value to the signers
in the rst round Then the signers distribute this value via an authenticated
protocol with all other nonsigning nodes as bystanders The nal result is the
majority of the results of these protocols
Such a protocol where some node do not send any messages and hence do
not sign is described in DS	 Theorem  In this protocol the nonsigning
nodes have to draw their conclusions from the messages they receive from the
signers The protocol runs for t rounds For our purposes the protocols could
also be run for only t rounds
A sketch of the proof is as follows If the sender is faulty there are at most
t   faulty signers left and all correct nodes will agree on the values of the s
subprotocols Hence all correct nodes will eventually agree on the same value
If the sender is correct all correct signers will send the same values in their
respective subprotocols These protocols have the property that the nodes reach
agreement on the values of the correct nodes even if the number of rounds is
not greater than the number of faulty nodes Hence a majority of the results of
the subprotocols will be the correct value
For s  
t no better fault tolerance than in the unsigned case can be
achieved This is shown in the following theorem
Theorem If the sender of a protocol does not sign its messages and s  
t
holds then Byzantine agreement cannot be reached with n  t assuming partial
authentication
Proof Suppose n  t and s  
t Then it is possible to partition the nodes into
three nonempty sets A B and C such that A contains exactly the nonsigners
and no set contains more than t elements The sender is a
 
 Now consider three
scenarios 
 
 

 and 


Scenario 
 
B faulty
 a
 
sends  in the rst round When a node b
i
receives
a message from A without any signatures ie the message passed only
nodes in A it forwards 
b
i
to all nodes All other messages are correctly
signed and forwarded
Scenario 

C faulty
 a
 
sends  in the rst round When a node c
i
receives
a message from A without any signatures ie the message passed only
nodes in A it forwards 
c
i
to all nodes All other messages are correctly
signed and forwarded
Scenario 

A faulty
 In the rst round a
 
sends  to C and  to B In the
remainder of the protocol a node a
i
forwards a signed message unchanged
to all nodes Unsigned messages are passed to B as  and to C as 
In 
 
 the nodes in C have to decide for  since the sender is correct For
the same reason the nodes in B have to decide for  in 

 Scenario 

has been
constructed in a way that it is indistinguishable from 
 
by C and from 

by
B Hence the nodes in B and C decide for dierent values in 

 contradicting
B  
With a similar argument it can be shown that the same restrictions apply
for crusader agreement
Sender is signer For n   s   
t  the protocol from DS	 mentioned above
could be used With the less ecient EIGprotocol in Fig  one signer can be
omitted such that Byzantine agreement is possible for n  s   
t
Theorem Assuming partial authentication the following holds	 If the sender
signs and n  s   
t holds the protocol in Fig  reaches Byzantine agreement
Proof We distinguish whether the sender is correct or faulty
Sender correct	 There is exactly one value signed by the sender Since there
are at least t  correct nodes at least t of which are signers at least one leaf
is reduced to the senders value signed by t correct nodes This value will be
considered recursively in the process of resolving Hence there is exactly one
value for the result of the protocol which is the value signed by the sender
Protocol for Byzantine Agreement
 The nodes ll their EIG trees for t  rounds
 A leaf is resolved to its value If the last sender was a signer the signature
is removed
 For a vertex on level r  t with label X two cases are distinguished
 X is signer Take the majority of the vertices resolved children
which carry Xs signature
 X is no signer Take the majority of the vertices resolved children
 The result of the protocol is the resolved value of the root
Fig 
 Byzantine agreement with partial authentication and a signing sender
Sender faulty	 Here we show that all vertices in the second level are common
The vertices which correspond to correct signers are common with the same
argumentation as in the case of a correct sender
The vertices which correspond to correct nonsigners are common because
they have at least t correct and signed children as opposed to at most t faulty
children Since these vertices are common same argumentation as above there
is always a majority of correctly resolved children
Finally there are the faulty vertices signed or not Their correct children
are common as can be shown as above For their faulty children to be common
it is by recursion necessary that all faulty vertices at level t with only faulty
ascendants be common This is the case since there are no such vertices
Hence all correct nodes take the same set of values as a basis for the nal
decision This leads to a common value  
For n  s  
t any protocol for complete authentication can be used Hence
Byzantine agreement is possible for any n   s   
t For   s  
t n   t
or n  s is necessary
Theorem Under the assumption of partial authentication the following holds	
If the sender signs its messages and   s  
t   holds then Byzantine
agreement is only possible if n   t  or n  s
Proof Sketch Byzantine agreement is always possible with n  s LSP	

Now suppose n  s  
t  and n  t 
 holds From Theorem  follows that
it is generally impossible to reach Byzantine agreement on the messages sent
by the nonsigners Hence the nonsigners may as well send no messages at all
Now let the faulty signers except the sender be in A the correct signers in B
and the nonsigners in C
If the sender is faulty A can behave towards C as if the sender sends 
while B receives and sends messages consistent with the sender saying 

The nodes in C cannot distinguish whether A or C is faulty although they have
to agree with the correct nodes  
Crusader agreement is possible for any number of faulty nodes It can easily
be veried that the protocol of Fig  reaches crusader agreement under the
assumption of partial authentication and a signing sender
 Complete Authentication
In this setting it is assumed that all nodes agree on the public keys of all nodes
If n  t this agreement may be reached using a trusted entity at the time of
setup eg a trusted person traveling from site to site or dynamically by using
a trusted server It is worth noting that if a trusted server would exist during
execution of the protocols it could also help solving Byzantine agreement very
easily With complete authentication n  t is possible This case is dealt with
to a great extent in the original papers PSL	 LSP	
 and in DS	
If n   t one should install complete authentication by agreement on the
public keys at the very beginning Once this level of authentication is reached an
arbitrary number of nodes may become faulty without disturbing agreement In
addition with complete authentication very simple and messageecient pro
tocols become possible
 Summary
In this paper we have focused on protocols for Byzantine agreement and crusader
agreement in the presence of incomplete and incorrect authentication We have
identied several possible scenarios which yield dierent degrees of maximum
fault tolerance
BA CA
No auth t  LSP t  Dol
Byz auth t  t 
Crus auth t  t
Partial auth t  if s  t  t  if s  t 
Sender doesnt sign t  else t  else
Partial auth t if s  t t
Sender signs t  if s  t  s  n
Complete auth t LSP t
Table  Minimal n for dierent levels of authentication and types of agreement
Table  gives an overview of the results It shows minimum values for n
number of nodes with regard to t maximum number of faulty nodes In the
results for partial authentication s denotes the number of signing nodes
In the past only the two extreme levels no authentication and complete
authentication have been investigated As can be seen there is a tradeo be
tween the level of authentication and the possible fault tolerance The stronger
the authentication the higher the possible fault tolerance Furthermore we have
shown that there are environments where the two agreement problems under
consideration do not have the same fault tolerance
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